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But freedom of the press, precious and vital through it is
to a free society, is not an absolute. What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling
the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies
some impairment of this First Amendment freedom. That
often presents a 'delicate and diffikind of determination
28
cult' task.
Roger D. Graham
11. Prenatal Examinations (Report of laboratory), W. VA. CODE
ch. 16, art. 4A, § 3 (Michie 1966);

12. Prostitution (Procuring female for house of prostitution W.VA.

(Marriage of prostitute and accussed), W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 8, § 8 (Michie 1966).
13. Public Assistance and Relief (Lists and records), W. VA.
CODE ch. 9, art. 11, § 16 (Michie 1966);
14. Records and Papers (Confidential records), W. VA. CODE ch.
5, art. 8, § 13 (Michie 1966);
15. Religious Organizations (Communications to clergy), W. VA.
CODE ch. 50, art. 6, §§ 10, 11 (Michie 1966);
16. Sales Tax (When information obtained is confidential), W.
VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 15, § 27 (Michie 1966) ;
17. Tax Commissioner (No disclosure as to individual business
information), W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 1, § 4a (Michie 1966);
28 Garland v. Torre, 259, F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958).
CODE ch. 61, art. 8, § 7 (Michie 1966);

Constitutional Law-Does A Private

College's Response To State
Legislation Constitute State Action?
"College authoritiesstand in loco parentis concerning the
physicial and moral welfare, and mental training of the
pupils, and... to that end they may ... make any rule or
regulation for the government, or betterment of their
pupils that a parent could for the same purpose."'
Wagner College, a privately supported Lutheran-affiliated liberal arts institution, expelled twenty-four of its students for refusing
to vacate the office of the Dean. Plaintiffs were members of "Black
Concern", a campus group organized to promote the interests of
black students. Plaintiffs visited the Dean's office to arrange a
meeting with Wagner College's president. When they failed to ar-

I

Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) (emphasis
added). A rigid doctrine in loco parentis is probably no longer a viable principle in the student-college relationship. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm.,
284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280,
286 (D. Coo. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747,
756 (W.D. La. 1968). See also Note, An Overview: The Private University
and Due Process, 1970 Duxx L. J. 795, 804 (1970).
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range a meeting the students refused to respond to the administration's repeated demands that they leave the Dean's office immediately. Finally the Dean of Students in charge of student discipline delivered an ultimatum: unless the students (who were already suspended) released the Dean and vacated his office, they
would be expelled. The Dean was subsequently released, but the
students did not leave. Following several hours of "occupation",
plaintiffs left the office after consulting with their attorney. Thereafter, the plaintiffs were expelled from the college. Although the
notices of expulsion failed to specify the rules violated, the procedures for appeal to the faculty council were explained. Unable to
convince the administration that it should suspend the expulsions,
plaintiffs were ejected from the campus prior to their appeal.
Plaintiffs then inititated an action in federal district court
alleging that Wagner College's expulsion procedures violated procedural due process; and that Wagner's hostility to blacks (exhibited by its failure to expel white students under similar circumstances) denied them equal protection. The district court denied
injunctive relief - and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, plaintiffs asserted the disciplinary actions of
Wagner College (notwithstanding its affiliation with a religious
denomination and its almost complete reliance on private financing) were state actions, since the rules governing student behavior were made in compliance with state law. Held, reversed and
remanded to the district court for a hearing on the question of
whether this compliance constituted state action in the disciplinary
policies of private colleges and universities. Coleman v. Wagner
College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
Wagner represents a unique twist to the expanding spectrum
of "state action" cases. The court found it vexing to agree with the
plaintiffs that state action existed because of the difficulty in
determining which state action theory applied. 3 Judge Kaufman,
2 Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Wagner College to reinstate
the expelled students pending a hearing, to conduct a hearing in conformity with procedural due process, and to stop discriminatory explusions of
blacks. The district court apparently limited its decision to whether the state
was responsible for the imposition of discipline by Wagner against the plaintiffs. Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1123 (2d Cir. 1970).
3 See Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 1045, 1056-64 (1968), for an explanation of the different theories the
courts have used in expanding the state action concept in civil rights cases.
The note writer grouped the various approaches into three categories: state
control (financial, administrative, or regulatory), indicia of control, and the
public function doctrine.
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the author of the Wagner opinion observed that a common test employed to establish state action was whether "a private organization
has undertaken to perform functions peculiarly 'public' in nature
and traditionally entrusted to the state.' 4 However, the "public
function" doctrine was not useful in Wagner because the preservation of internal order has customarily been a function of private
colleges and universities.5 The Wagner court was concerned with
whether state intrusion into this traditional sphere by requiring
private colleges to formulate displinary regulations constitutes sufficient meddling to move private colleges within the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment.6
In light of plaintiff's affirmative assertions on this issue, the
court noted that plaintiffs were not contending that all of the
actions of Wagner College's administration constituted state action,
but only those acts taken by Wagner in response to the state's
legislation requiring colleges to formulate discipinary regulations. 7 The primary authority relied upon by plaintiffs was Judge
Friendly's dictum in Powe v. Miles:8 "state action would be . . .
present [in a case involving campus demonstrations] if New York
had undertaken to set policy for the control of demonstrations
in all private universities."0'
Does a response to a general order by the legislature to private
individuals (i.e., colleges) constitute state action when the specific
act was not subject to state approval. The court analyzed the nature of the alleged state action, comparing it with Public
Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollakio
4449 F.2d at 1121. See e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 336 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

5E.g. John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923).
GNote that the West Virginia Board of Regents has deemed it necessary that the state owned and supported colleges and universities should have a
codified policy regarding student rights and responsibilities. POLICIES, RULES,

AND REGULATIONS REGARDING STUDENT RIGHTs, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CONDUCT IN
WEST VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (1970).

7N. Y. EDUCATION LAW §6450 (McKinney 1969) provides that:

1. The trustees or other governing board of every college chartered by the regents . . . shall adopt rules and regulations for the
maintenance of public order on college campuses . . . and provide a
program for the enforcement . . . (including penalties for violating
those rules) .
2. If the trustees . . . fails [SIG] to file the rules and regulations .
(on time) such college shall not be eligible to receive any
state aid or assistance ....
8407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
9 1d. at 81.
20 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Pollak represents the state action which results
when a public agency of the government regulates a private business or individual. Here a public commission investigated and approved the installa-
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and with Smith v. Allwright,11 two cases clearly involving state
action. In Pollak the public commission that licensed and regulated
the transit company had investigated the challenged practices and
granted approval.lZ However, in Wagner the court recognized that
no state official or agency had ever expressed approval of Wagner's specific policies concerning its disciplinary procedure. Nor, as
in Smith, was the expulsion of students by a private college an encroachment in an area normally reserved for state regulation.
The analogy between Wagner and Pollak, Smith and other
state action case falters because the court in Wagner conceded that
the use of the word "regulation" of order on campuses was meaningless since New York failed to declare itself a "reviewer" of private college regulations. The amended education law merely
required all colleges to draft regulations dealing with campus order
and to register them with designated state officials. The court did
not conclude that Wagner acted as an agent of the state. Armed
only with Judge Friendly's dictum in Powe, the majority sidestep.
ped the issue of whether sufficient state involvement to make the
specific art of disciplining errant students state action when the
legislature generally required all colleges to adopt more stringent
policies towards student demonstrations, without requiring approval by the state of those policies. The majority merely said that although the education law did not create state action on its face,
it would be "cognizant of the possibility"' 3 that the legislature intended through the spirit of the law to gather private colleges and
14
universities within its control and supervision.

tion of radios and the playing of "music as you ride" radio programs in street
cars and buses owned by the transit company, a privately owned public utility
corporation.
113 21 U.S. 649 (1944). A state granted a political party the authority to
control primary elections. The party's unconstitutional denial of the right to
vote to Negroes was found to be state actions by proxy.
12The commission had the preogative to approve or disapprove the playing of radio programs in the transit company's streetcars and buses. The
commission could prohibit such activity if the conditions were considered unsafe, uncomfortable or inconvenient.
13 We are however, cognizant of the possibility that the statute
may have been intended, or may be applied, to mean more than it
purports to say. More specifically, (the education law) may be intended or applied as a command to the colleges of the state to adopt a
new, more severe attitude toward campus disruption and to impose
harsh sanctions on unruly students.
429 F.2d at 1124.
14 The court noted that the legislature and the governor were anxious
fDr passage of this education bill because of the unrest and disorder on college

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss3/13

4

Garrett: Constitutional Law--Does a Private College's Response to State Le

1971]

CASE COMMENTS

While the majority in Wagner declined to rule that state
action was present, Judge Friendly in a concurring opinion was
not reluctant to go beyond his dictum in Powe and assert that
Wagner involved state action. Judge Friendly believed that if the
legislature wanted to deter campus disorder by requiring colleges
to promulgate rules and regulations then the state should be responsible for "deterrence by excessive sanctions and lack of fair
procedure for enforcement."' 5 Judge Friendly was also concerned
with the "symbolic appearance" of disciplinary regulations formulated by colleges in response to a state directive rather than on
their own initiative. The legislature ordered all colleges to formulate rules to maintain order on campuses but did not require
those rules to be approved by the state. However, if a college failed to file these rules, it would lose its eligibility for state aid. Although, Wagner College was free to formulate specific rules concerning the maintenance of order on its campus, Judge Friendly
reasoned that it was a "significantly different symbolic appearance"
for Wagner College to formulate its rules in compliance with a
state order.' 0 Thus, Judge Friendly concluded that although Wagner College had complete freedom to devise the rules governing
order on its campus, state action might exist if citizens reasonably
believed Wagner College was acting pursuant to the state's command."7
Wagner is an example of the lower federal courts applying
the state action concept to private colleges and universities.' 8 The
procedural safeguards and privileges guaranteed to the individual
by the United States Constitution are directed only against governmental action, not private action.' 9 If conduct by a college constitutes state action, students are entitled to the same constitutional
right protected by the procedural safeguards of due process as is
campuses. It quoted partially from Governor Rockefeller's memorandum: "the
intolerable situation on the Cornell University Campus dramatizes the urgent
need f6r adequate plans for student-university relations and clear rules governing conduct on the campus." 429 F.2d at 1124 citing 2 McKinney's 1969
session Law 2546.
15 429 F.2d at 1126.
18Judge Friendly illustrated this concept of "symbolic appearance" by
remarking that Wagner College's regulations were preceded by a statement that
they were formulated in accordance with the amended New York Education
Law, including section 6450 which was quoted in full. Id. at 1126.
'l Id.at 1127.
18 E.g. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'2 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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every citizen.20 Although private colleges perform a public
function, it does not logically follow that they either stand in the
same position as the public schools or are subject to constitutional restraints on governmental action to the same extent as private
22
persons who govern a company town;2l control a political party;
operate a city streetcar and bus service; 23 lease a restaurant in a
city parting lot; 24 or own a shopping center parking lot used as
the community market place. 25 Whether a private college is always "private" is not easily determined. 2 Howard University,
which received a large percentage of its revenues from annual appropriations made by Congress, was held to be a private university notwithstanding the amount of governmental aid.21 On the
other hand state action clearly existed when the state legislature
required Tulane University, a private university, to refuse admis28
sion to qualified blacks.
"D,Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
A student being expelled from a state college is entitled at least to a notice of
the charges and an opportunity for a fair hearing. Dixon marked the first time
the constitution was brought to the campus. Wright, The Constitution on the

Campus, 22

VAND.

L.

REV.

1027, 1059 (1969).

Marsh v. Alabama, 336 U.S. 501 (1946).
22 E.g. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
23 Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
24 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2
,Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
28 The courts have generally found it difficult to distinguish the private
action of private colleges from the public action of private colleges or the
action of public colleges. E.g., cf. Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1969); and Hammond v. The University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1965). Legal scholars, on the other hand, have recommended that this distinction be dropped. See, e.g. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its
Students-a Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L. J. 643, 650 (1966); Johnson, The
Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 344, 349 (1964);
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. REV. 290, 291-92 (1968).
27 Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd
without reaching constitutional questions, 421 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In
Greene, the court held that Howard University was not a governmental body
irrespective of 1) the annual appropriations made by Congress; 2) the right
of the Secretary of HEW to inspect and control Howard's spending of government funds; and 3) the requirement that Howard University's president and
directors file an annual report with the Secretary.
2s Buillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D.
La. 1062). The nature of state involvement may distinguish the Guillory and
Greene cases. In Greene, Howard was receiving Federal funds. In Guillory, state
law required Tulane to engage in racial discrimination. If a state cannot discriminate in its public institutions, it should not be able to do so in private
institutions within its jurisdiction. Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
21
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In Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University2l and Powe v.
Miles,30 both decided prior to Wagner, state action advocates raised
the issue of when private colleges and universities can be brought
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment.
In Grossner, the plaintiffs who had actively participated in the
1968 riots at Columbia University, sought to enjoin the university
from carrying out disciplinary actions. Plaintiffs relied on the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 in alleging the federal courts had jurisdiction
to enjoin Columbia University, a private institution.31 The court
rejected plaintiffs' assertions that Columbia acted "under color"
of state law and that state action was present, although Columbia
received substantial government grants for research and development.3 2 Plaintiffs recognized Columbia was not a part of the state
government but asserted that the "private" conduct of Columbia,
which ordinarily is outside the scope of the fourteenth amendment,
may be state action when there is sufficient state involvement.
However, the court distinguished Grossner from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority33 because the state was not involved in
any way with the disciplinary measures taken by Columbia.
In Powe v. Miles,34 the court found state action, but the plaintiffs were denied relief, since they had not been deprived of any constitutional rights following their violation of the university's dem-

2 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
s0 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
3' Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. (1964):

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects ... any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-

ties secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or proper proceeding for
for redress.
32 Plaintiffs relied upon the guidelines for state "involvement" formulated
by Justice Clark in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722

(1960), i.e. "private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to
the Equal Protection Clause unless to some extent the State in any of its
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it." The Grossner
court rejected the plaintiff's notion of state involvement because, of the
millions of dollars of government funds received by Columbia, only 20 percent
originated from the State of New York. Moreover, the court asserted that the
"receipt of maney from the state is not, without a good deal more, enough to
make the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the government." 287 F.

Supp. at 547-48.
3565 U.S. 715 (1960). See note 81 supra.
a, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
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onstration guidelines." In Powell, Alfred University was under contract with the state of New York to operate the state ceramics college. The plaintiffs, students of the ceramics college, were dismissed
for participating in an anti-war demonstration on the football field
during a "parent's day" ROTC military review.30 Although the
court held that the disciplinary proceedings conducted by Alfred
University constituted state action, the University's demonstration
guidelines as adopted and enforced by the Dean were not found to
be an unreasonable denial of plaintiffs' fundamental rights37 In
response to the question of Alfred University's authority to restrict
student demonstration on campus, the court noted that "London
does not make all of Hyde Park available for speechifying."' 88
The courts have been reluctant to interfere in the relationship
between a student and a private college. Traditionally, private colleges have been free to regulate the academic and non-academic
conduct of its students. If campuses continue to be marked by
disorder, state legislatures may be tempted to enact legislation requiring colleges to adopt rules designed to maintain order on the
campus. Whether a general order by a state legislature requiring
private colleges to adopt rules, without expressly retaining the
authority to approve them, constitutes state action is still unsettled.
Wagner suggests there may be sufficient state involvement to constiute state action and thus, bring private colleges within the
ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
William Charles Garrett

35 Students had the express right to demonstrate peacefully providing they adhered to certain guidelines including, inter alia, the
allowance of access to and from exits of offices and buildings, avoidance
of physical harassment and verbal abuse, avoidance of class disruptions, observance of the right of guest speakers to speak, and notice to the dean of students
forty-eight hours in advance of any proposed demonstration.
36 The student demonstrators were warned by the Dean of Students that
they were violating Alfred University's policy on demonstrations and told that
if they did not leave they would be disciplined. Plaintiffs failed to leave and
were "provisionally suspended" pending a hearing to be held the following
day.
.7Alfred University's demonstration policy provided
that only the Dean
of Students had the authority to make initial judgments as to whether the
guidelines were being observed. If the Dean suspended sudents for not following the guidelines, then those suspended had a right to an immediate hearing
with a review board. Each side was permitted to present three witnesses with
the right to cross-examine, and the only issue to be considered was whether
the demonstrators had followed the guidelines.
38 407 F.2d at 85.
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